In this paper, we introduce the abstraction of Dual Form Signatures as a useful framework for proving security (existential unforgeability) from static assumptions for schemes with special structure that are used as a basis of other cryptographic protocols and applications. We demonstrate the power of this framework by proving security under static assumptions for close variants of pre-existing schemes:
Introduction
Digital signatures are a fundamental technique for verifying the authenticity of a digital message. The significance of digital signatures in cryptography is also amplified by their use as building blocks for more complex cryptographic protocols. Recently, we have seen several pairing based signature schemes (e.g., [22, 18, 29, 71] ) that are both practical and have added structure which has been used to build other primitives ranging from Aggregate Signatures [20, 58] to Oblivious Transfer [30, 44] . Ideally, for such a fundamental cryptographic primitive we would like to have security proofs from straightforward, static complexity assumptions.
Meeting this goal for certain systems is often challenging. For instance, the Camenisch and Lysyanskaya signature scheme [29] 1 has been very influential as it is used as the foundation for a wide variety of advanced cryptographic systems, including anonymous credentials [29, 9, 8] , group signatures [29, 7] , ecash [27] , uncloneable functions [26] , batch verification [28] , and RFID encryption [6] . While the demonstrated utility of CL signatures has made them desirable, it has been difficult to reduce their security to a static security assumption. Currently, the CL signature scheme is proven secure under the LRSW assumption [60] , an interactive complexity assumption that closely mirrors the description of the signature scheme itself. In addition, the interactive assumption transfers to the systems built around these signatures.
The identity-based sequential aggregate signatures of Boldyreva, Gentry, O'Neill, and Yum [14, 15] were also proven in the random oracle model under a interactive assumption (justified in the generic bilinear group model), which again closely mirrors the underlying signature scheme itself. (This can be viewed as providing a proof of the scheme only in the generic group model.) Proofs of complicated interactive assumptions in the generic group model have several disadvantages. First, they are themselves complex and prone to error. In fact, the original version of the BGOY identity-based sequential aggregate signature scheme [14] relied on an assumption that was shown to be false, and the scheme was insecure [50] . This scheme and proof were corrected in [15] . Secondly, such proofs do not tend to provide much insight into the security of the scheme. This lack of insight tends to hinder transferring schemes to other settings. For example, many schemes developed in bilinear groups now have lattice-based analogs, and these transformations reused high-level ideas from the original security proofs in the bilinear group setting. Techniques from [71] were used in the lattice setting in [25] , techniques from [31] were used in [32] , and techniques from [17] were used in [2] . This kind of transference of ideas from the bilinear setting to the lattice setting is unlikely to be achieved through generic group proofs.
In this work, we develop techniques that can be applied to prove security from static assumptions for new signature schemes as well as (slight variants of) pre-existing schemes. Providing new proofs for these existing schemes provides a meaningful sanity check as well as new insight into their security. This kind of sanity check is valuable not only for schemes proven in the generic group model, but also for signatures (CL signatures included) that require extra checks to rule out trivial breaks (e.g. not allowing the message signed to be equal to 0), since these subtleties can easily be missed at first glance. Having new proofs from static assumptions for variants of schemes like CL signatures and BGOY signatures gives us additional confidence in their security without having to sacrifice the variety of applications built from them. Ultimately, this provides us with a fuller understanding of these kinds of signatures, and is a critical step towards obtaining proofs under the simplest and weakest assumptions.
Dual Form Signatures Our work is centered around a new abstraction that we call Dual Form Signatures. Dual Form Signatures have similar structure to existing signature schemes, however they have two signing algorithms, Sign A and Sign B , that respectively define two forms of signatures that will both verify under the same public key. In addition, the security definition will categorize forgeries into two disjoint types, Type I and Type II. Typically, these forgery types will roughly correspond with signatures of form A and B.
In a Dual Form system, we will demand three security properties (stated informally here):
A-I Matching. If an attacker is only given oracle access to Sign A , then it is hard to create any forgery that is not of Type I.
B-II Matching.
If an attacker is only given oracle access to Sign B , then it is hard to create any forgery that is not of Type II.
Dual-Oracle Invariance. If an attacker is given oracle access to both Sign A and Sign B and a "challenge signature" which is either from Sign A or Sign B , the attacker's probability of producing a Type I forgery is approximately the same when the challenge signature is from Sign A as when the challenge signature is from Sign B .
A Dual Form Signature scheme immediately gives a secure signature scheme if we simply set the signing algorithm Sign = Sign A . Unforgeability now follows from a hybrid argument. Consider any EUF-CMA [43] attacker A. By the A-I matching property, we know that it might have a noticeable probability of producing a Type I forgery, but has only a negligible probability of producing any other kind of forgery. We then show that must also be negligible. By the dual-oracle invariance property, the probability of producing a Type I forgery will be close to if we gradually replace the signing algorithm with Sign B , one signature at a time. Once all of the signatures the attacker receives are from Sign B , the B-II Matching property implies that the probability of producing a Type I forgery must be negligible in the security parameter.
We demonstrate the usefulness of our framework with two main applications, using significantly different techniques. This illustrates the versatility of our framework and its adaptability to schemes with different underlying structures. In particular, while dual form signatures are related to the dual system encryption methodology introduced by Waters [72] for proving full security of IBE schemes and other advanced encryption functionalities, we demonstrate that our dual form framework can be applied to signature schemes that have no known encryption or IBE analogs. Though all of the applications given here use bilinear groups, the dual form framework can be used in other contexts, including proofs under general assumptions.
Our first application is a slight variant of the Camenisch-Lysyanskaya signature scheme, set in a bilinear group G of composite order N = p 1 p 2 p 3 . This application is surprising, since these signatures do not have a known IBE analog. We let G pi for each i = 1, 2, 3 denote the subgroup of order p i in the group. The Sign A algorithm produces signatures which exhibit the CL structure in the G p1 and G p2 subgroups and are randomized in the G p3 subgroup. The Sign B algorithm produces signatures which exhibit the CL structure in the G p1 subgroup and are randomized in the G p2 and G p3 subgroups. Type I and II forgeries roughly mirror signatures of form A and B. The verification procedure in our scheme will verify that the signature is well formed in the G p1 subgroup, but not "check" the other subgroups.
We prove security in the dual form framework based on three static subgroup decision-type assumptions, similar to those used in [56] . The most challenging part of the proof is dual-oracle invariance, which we prove by developing a backdoor verification test (performed by the simulator) which acts as an almostperfect distinguisher between forgery types. Here we face a potential paradox, which is similar to that encountered in dual system encryption [72, 56] : we need to create a simulator that does not know whether the challenge signature it produces is distributed as an output of Sign A or Sign B , but it also must be able to test the type of the attacker's forgery. To arrange this, we create a "backdoor verification" test, which the simulator can perform to test the form of all but a small space of signatures. Essentially, this backdoor verification test acts an almost-perfect type distinguisher which fails to correctly determine the type of only a very small set of potential forgeries.
The challenge signature of unknown form produced by the simulator will fall within the untestable space; however, with very high probability a forgery by an attacker will not, because some information about this space is information-theoretically hidden from the attacker. This is possible because the elements of the verification key are all in the subgroup G p1 , and the space essentially resides in G p2 . Thus the verification key reveals no information about the hidden space. The only information about the space that the attacker receives is contained in the single signature of unknown type, and we show that this is insufficient for the attacker to be able to construct a forgery that falls inside the space for a different message. This is reminiscent of the concept of nominal semi-functionality in dual system encryption (introduced in [56] ): in this setting, the simulator produces a key of unknown type which is correlated in its view with the ciphertext it produces, but this correlation is information-theoretically hidden from the attacker. This correlation prevents the simulator from determining the type of the key for itself by testing decryption against a ciphertext.
We believe that the existing techniques and systems built around CL signatures should apply to our variant with modest modifications. While our assumptions are not strictly comparable to the LRSW assumption, they have the qualitative feature of being static. Moreover, the security of our modified scheme can "fall back" on the LRSW assumption in the G p1 subgroup, so security cannot be any worse. One can also view our proofs as a heuristic argument for gaining more confidence in the security of the prior scheme and the LRSW assumption.
As a second application of our dual form framework, we prove security from static assumptions for a variant of the BGOY identity-based sequential aggregate signature scheme. Aggregate signatures are useful because they allow signature "compression," meaning that any n individual signatures by n (possibly) different signers on n (possibly) different messages can be transformed into an aggregate signature of the same size as an individual one that nevertheless allows verifying that all these signers signed their messages. However, aggregate signatures do not provide compression of the public keys, which are needed for signature verification. In the identity-based setting, only the identities of the signers are needed -this is a big savings because identities are much shorter than randomly generated keys. However, identity-based aggegate signatures have been notoriously difficult to realize. We first prove security for a basic public-key version of the scheme, and then show that security for its identity-based sequential aggregate analog reduces to security of the basic scheme (in the random oracle model, as for the original proof). Our techniques here are significantly different, and reflect the different structure of the scheme (it is this structure that allows for aggregation). The core structure of the underlying public key scheme is composed of three group elements of the form g a+bm g r1r2 , g r1 , g r2 , where m is a message (or a hash of the message), a, b are fixed parameters, and r 1 , r 2 are randomly chosen for each signature. There are significant differences between this and the core structure of other notable signatures, like CL and Waters signatures [29, 71] . Here, the message term is not multiplicatively randomized, but rather additively randomized by the quadratic term r 1 r 2 . It is the quadratic nature of this term that allows verification via application of the bilinear map while thwarting attackers who try to combine received signatures by taking linear combinations in the exponents. This unique structure presents a challenge for static security analysis, and we develop new techniques to achieve a proof for a variant of this scheme in our dual form framework.
We still employ composite order subgroups, with the main structure of the scheme reflected in the G p1 subgroup and the other two subgroups used for differentiating between signature and forgery types. However, to prove dual-oracle invariance, we rely on the fact that the scheme has the basic structure of a one-time signature scheme embedded in it, in addition to the quadratic mechanism to prevent an attacker from forming new signatures by taking combinations of received signatures. We capture the security resulting from this combination of structures through a static assumption for our dual-oracle invariance proof, and we show that this assumption holds in the generic group model. Though we do employ the generic group model as a check on our static assumptions, we believe that our proof provides valuable intuition into the security of the scheme that is not gleaned from a proof based on an interactive assumption or given solely in the generic group model. Also, checking the security of a static assumption in the generic group model is much easier (and less error-prone) than checking the security of an interactive assumption or scheme. We believe that the techniques and insights provided by our proof are an important step toward finding a prime order variant of the scheme that is secure under more standard assumptions, such as the decisional linear assumption.
In Appendix C, we provide one more application: a signature scheme using the private key structure in the Lewko-Waters IBE system [56] . The LW system itself can be viewed as a composite order extension of the Boneh-Boyen selectively secure IBE scheme [16] , although the structure of the proofs of these systems are very different (LW achieves adaptive security). For this reason, we call these "BB-derived" signatures. While the existing LW IBE system can be transformed into a signature scheme using Naor's 2 general transformation, our scheme checks the signature "directly" without going through an IBE encryption. The resulting signature has a constant number of elements in the public key and signatures consist of two group elements.
Given that several interesting applications have arisen from CL signatures, a natural question is to ask if one can follow in the same path using BB-derived signatures. BB-derived signatures share desirable structural features with CL signatures, making them prime candidates for use in building the many applications that have been built from CL signatures. Using BB-derived signatures as a base scheme would also have several advantages. First, BB-derived signatures contain only two group elements, while CL signatures contain three. In addition, CL signatures require additional checks to rule out degenerate cases (i.e. the message cannot be 0, and the first signature element cannot be the identity). These additional checks percolate up to the applications that are built upon CL signatures, and might require more diligence to avoid errors easily made, whereas the BB-derived signature verification does not need to check for any such degenerate cases. 2 Naor's observation was noted in [19] .
Further Directions While we have focused here on applying our techniques for core short signatures, we envision that dual form signatures will be a framework for proving security of many different signature systems that have to this point been difficult to analyze under static assumption Some examples include embed additional structure, such as Attribute-Based signatures [61] and Quoteable signatures [3] . Attributebased signatures allow a signer to sign a message with a predicate satisfied by his attributes, without revealing any additional information about his attribute set. Our framework could potentially be applied to obtain stronger security proofs for ABS schemes, such as the schemes of [61] proved only in the generic group model. Quoteable signatures enable derivation of signatures from each other under certain conditions, and current constructions are proved only selectively secure [3] . Another future target is signatures that "natively" sign group elements [1] .
The primary goal of our work is providing techniques for realizing security under static assumptions, and we leverage composite order groups as a convenient setting for this. A natural future direction is to complement our work by discovering prime order analogs of our techniques. Many previous systems were originally constructed in composite order groups and later transferred into prime order groups [21, 46, 23, 45, 24, 70, 47, 52, 51, 38, 39, 55, 66] . The general techniques presented in [38, 54] do not seem directly applicable here, but we emphasize that our dual form framework is not tied to composite order groups and could also be used in the prime order setting.
Related Work
Goldwasser, Micali, and Rivest [43] gave the first formal definitions of security for signature schemes. Most early signature systems proved secure in the standard model were "tree-based". This included schemes built from general assumptions [11, 63, 68] as well as some that proposed more efficient solutions [37, 34, 35] that traded off the tree depth with the size of the public key.
The term "hash and sign" has been informally associated with more efficient signature schemes where the signature is compact and not built in a tree form. There exist several hash and sign systems in the random oracle model from different assumptions such as [69, 65, 12, 67, 22, 41] , among others. In the standard model, there have been signature schemes with short signatures based on the Strong RSA assumption by Gennaro, Halevi, and Rabin [40] and Cramer-Shoup [36] and the RSA assumption by Hohenberger and Waters [48, 49] .
Using bilinear groups, there are notable signature constructions by Boneh and Boyen [18] , Camenisch and Lysyanskaya [29] , and Waters [71] . The proofs of each of these schemes do not apply the random oracle heuristic. Boneh and Boyen [18] introduce a non-static "q-type" assumption called q-Strong Diffie-Hellman to prove security and Camenisch and Lysyanskaya prove their security based on the interactive LRSW assumption. The Waters' signature scheme proves security on the weaker Computational Diffie-Hellman assumption, but requires a larger public key in the scheme. As noted above, several advanced cryptosystems have been built using these signature schemes as building blocks.
Aggregate signatures were first introduced and realized in [20] . Due to the savings on bandwidth and storage that signature compression permits, aggregate signatures have proven useful in many practical applications, including PKI certificate chains and route attestation in Secure BGP. There has been a significant amount of work on aggregate signatures in the public-key setting [20, 59, 58, 64, 4] . In the identity-based setting, the first progress was made by Gentry and Ramzan [42] , who presented a "synchronized" (using the terminology of [4] ) identity-based aggregate signature scheme, meaning that signers are required to have synchronized clocks. However, it is desirable to avoid this requirement. The BGOY scheme that we modify [15] employs "sequential" aggregation (first introduced by [59] ) instead of requiring synchronization. This means that the aggregation process cannot be carried out by anyone, but it must be done by the signers themselves one-by-one at the same time they produce their signatures. This turns out to be sufficient for many practical applications.
As previously noted, our dual form abstraction bears some resemblance to the dual system encryption technique introduced by Waters [72] ; however, there are several important distinctions. While Naor showed that the private keys for IBE systems give immediate rise to signature schemes, the converse is not known to be true and several dual form signature systems such as CL signatures have no known IBE analog. In addition, even the signatures derived from IBE systems will typically have different verification algorithms than the generic one derived from Naor's technique. Finally, we note that our dual form signature system is formally given as an abstraction. Our techniques are also related to techniques which have been employed recently in the area of leakage-resilience, e.g. [53, 62, 5] . In these works, the form of signatures or ciphertexts changes as the security proof progresses, similar to our strategy of changing signatures from one form to the other. There is also some relation to the work of Bellare and Goldwasser [10] , who present signatures containing a (simulation-sound) NIZK proof of knowledge, and one can think of using the NIZK simulator as an alternate signing algorithm. The main contribution of our work is formalizing such techniques into an abstraction which can be broadly applied to signature schemes, particularly useful schemes like CL signatures.
Dual Form Signatures
We now define dual form signatures and their security properties. We then show that creating a secure dual form signature system naturally yields an existentially unforgeable signature scheme. We emphasize that the purpose of the dual form signature framework is to provide a template for creating security proofs from static assumptions, but the techniques employed to prove the required properties can be tailored to the structure of the particular scheme.
Definition
We define a dual form signature system to have the following algorithms:
KeyGen(λ): Given a security parameter λ, generate a public key, VK, and a private key, SK.
Sign A (SK, M ): Given a message, M , and the secret key, output a signature, σ.
Sign B (SK, M ): Given a message, M , and the secret key, output a signature, σ.
Verify(VK, M, σ): Given a message, the public key, and a signature, output 'true' or 'false'.
We note that a dual form signature scheme is identical to a usual signature scheme, except that it has two different signing algorithms. While only one signing algorithm will be used in the resulting existentially unforgeable scheme, having two different signing algorithms will be useful in our proof of security.
Forgery Classes
In addition to having two signature algorithms, the dual form signature framework also considers two disjoint classes of forgeries. Whether or not a signature verifies depends on the message that it signs as well as the verification key. For a fixed verification key, we consider the set of pairs, S × M, over the message space, M, and the signature space, S. Consider the subset of these pairs for which the Verify algorithm outputs 'true': we will denote this set as V. 3 We let V I and V II denote two disjoint subsets of V, and we refer to signatures from these sets as Type I and Type II forgeries, respectively. In our applications, we will have the property V = V I ∪ V II in addition to V I ∩ V II = ∅, but only the latter property is necessary.
We will use these classes to specify two different types of forgeries received from an adversary in our proof of security. In general, these classes are not the same as the output ranges of our two signing algorithms. However, Type I forgeries will be related to signatures output by the Sign A algorithm and Type II forgeries will be related to signatures output by the Sign B algorithm. The precise relationships between the forgery types and the signing algorithms are explicitly defined by the following set of security properties for the dual form system.
Security Properties
We define the following three security properties for a dual form signature scheme. We consider an attacker A who is initially given the verification key VK produced by running the key generation algorithm. The value SK is also produced, and not given to A.
A-I Matching: Let O A be an oracle for the algorithm Sign A . More precisely, this oracle takes a message as input, and produces a signature that is identically distributed to an output of the Sign A algorithm (for the SK produced from the key generation). We say that a dual form signature is A-I matching if for all probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) algorithms, A, there exists a negligible function, negl(λ), in the security parameter λ such that:
This property guarantees that if an attacker is only given oracle access to Sign A , then it is hard to create anything but a Type I forgery.
B-II Matching:
Let O B be an oracle for the algorithm Sign B (which takes in a message and outputs a signature that is identically distributed an output of the Sign B algorithm). We say that a dual form signature is B-II matching if for all PPT algorithms, A:
This property guarantees that if an attacker is only given oracle access to Sign B , then it is hard to create anything but a Type II forgery.
Dual-Oracle Invariance (DOI): First we define the dual-oracle security game.
1. The key generation algorithm is run, producing a verification key VK and a secret key SK.
2. The adversary, A, is given the verification key VK and oracle access to O 0 = Sign A (·) and O 1 = Sign B (·).
3.
A outputs a challenge message, m.
4.
A random bit, b ← {0, 1}, is chosen, and then a signature σ ← O b (m) is computed and given to A. We call σ the challenge signature.
5.
A continues to have oracle access to O 0 and O 1 .
6.
A outputs a forgery pair (m * , σ * ), where A has not already received a signature for m * .
We say that a dual form signature scheme has dual-oracle invariance if, for all PPT attackers A, there exists a negligible function, negl(λ), in the security parameter λ such that
We say that a dual form signature scheme is secure if it satisfies all three of these security properties.
Secure Signature Scheme
Once we have developed a secure dual form signature system, (KeyGen DF , Sign • KeyGen = KeyGen
• Verify = Verify
DF
Our new secure signature scheme is identical to the dual form system except that we have arbitrarily chosen to use Sign A as our signing algorithm. We could have equivalently elected to use Sign B . (In which case, we would modify the dual-oracle invariance property to be with respect to Type II forgeries instead of Type I forgeries. Alternatively, we could strengthen the property to address both forgery types.) Now we will prove that this signature scheme is secure.
Proof of Security
We prove: We begin by defining some additional games. We denote the first game as Game Real . Game Real is the usual existential unforgeability security game for the digital signature scheme described in Construction 1. We denote the advantage of an algorithm A in Game Real as Adv . The next game, Game OnlyI , is the same as Game Real , except the attacker is limited to producing Type I forgeries. Finally, Game OnlyI,B , will be defined in exactly the same way as Game OnlyI except that all of the attacker's queries are answered with signatures from the Sign B algorithm.
We now introduce an additional property, oracle invariance, which we will show is implied by dual-oracle invariance through a hybrid argument.
Oracle Invariance: We say that a dual form signature scheme satisfies oracle invariance if for all PPT algorithms, A:
In other words, given access to an oracle for either signature algorithm, an attacker is nearly equally likely to output a Type I forgery. Here, we must also restrict the output of A to be a forgery in the traditional sense of existential unforgeability: this means that A is not allowed to output a signature on a message it has queried to the signing oracle. We now prove that dual-oracle invariance implies oracle invariance. To prove Theorem 2.2, we will use a hybrid argument over a sequence of games. Suppose that there exists an attacker, A, on Game OnlyI , and that A makes a polynomial number of queries, q, to the signature oracle. Then, for 0 ≤ k ≤ q, we define Game k to be the same as Game OnlyI , except the first k signatures are answered by the Sign B oracle and the last q − k signatures are answered by the Sign A oracle. We will denote the attacker's advantage in Game k by Adv If the challenge signature that B receives is from the Sign A algorithm, then A will be playing Game k−1 , and if the challenge signature is from the Sign B algorithm then A will be playing Game k . Therefore, if the challenge signature is from Sign A , then the probability that A creates a valid, Type I forgery is exactly Adv
A . Since B simply forwards this signature to the challenger, the probability that B outputs a forgery in V I is equal to Adv k−1 A . Likewise, if the challenge signature is from Sign B , then the probability that B outputs a forgery in V I is equal to Adv k A . Hence,
This proves the lemma.
Using Lemma 2.1, we can prove Theorem 2.2.
Proof of Theorem 2.2. Suppose that there exists an attacker, A, that breaks the oracle invariance of the dual form system, attaining a probability difference of . We will construct an algorithm B, such that Adv
B is given access to an oracle for either the Sign A algorithm or the Sign B algorithm, depending on whether it is playing Game 0 or Game q , respectively. B can use the oracle to sign any queries made by algorithm A. A will return a forgery (m * , σ * ), that B can output as a forgery. If B is playing Game 0 , then the probability that it is successful is exactly equal to the probability that A produces a Type I forgery given access to a Sign A oracle. Likewise, if B is playing Game q , then the probability that it is successful is exactly equal to the probability that A produces a Type I forgery given access to a Sign B oracle. That is,
However, if there exists an attacker, namely B, that can distinguish between Game 0 and Game q with advantage , then there is some 0 ≤ k ≤ q such that B can distinguish between Game k and Game k−1 with advantage at least /q. However, we know from Lemma 2.1 that if there exists an attacker that can distinguish between Game k and Game k−1 with advantage /q, then we can create an attacker that breaks dual-oracle invariance with advantage /q.
Since q is polynomial, if is non-negligible, then /q is also non-negligible. Thus, if there exists an attacker that breaks oracle invariance, then there exists an attacker that breaks dual-oracle invariance. This proves the theorem.
We now prove Theorem 2.1. Our proof consists of a hybrid argument over a series of games. Between each step, we use the attacker against Construction 1 to break A-I matching, B-II matching, or oracle invariance. We begin by correctly simulating the signature scheme and limiting the attacker to Type I forgeries using the A-I matching property of the dual form system. Then, using the oracle invariance property of the dual form system, we change the simulation of the signature scheme to use the Sign B algorithm to respond to the attacker's queries. However, since the attacker is still limited to Type I forgeries, if it produces a forgery then it violates the B-II matching property of the dual form system. Proof. This follows from the definition of the oracle invariance of a dual form system. B will be given oracle access to either Sign A or Sign B from the oracle invariance challenger. B will use this oracle to answer all of the signing queries made by algorithm A. If B receives an oracle for Sign A from the challenger, then it will be simulating Game OnlyI , and if B receives an oracle for Sign B , it will be simulating game Game OnlyI,B .
Eventually, B will return the forgery output by A. When the output of A is a Type I forgery, the output of B must be a Type I forgery and in particular,
Thus, B breaks the oracle invariance of the dual form system with advantage .
Finally, we now show that the advantage of any attacker against Game OnlyI,B is negligible.
Lemma 2.4. Suppose that there exists an algorithm, A, such that Adv
OnlyI,B A = . Then, we can construct an algorithm, B, with advantage in breaking the B-II matching property of the dual form system.
Proof. Again, this follows from the definition of B-II matching for the dual form system. If we simply let B = A, we know that with probability , A will create a valid Type I forgery given only oracle access to the Sign B algorithm. This means that B will succeed in breaking B-II matching with probability . Theorem 2.1 now follows.
Background on Composite Order Bilinear Groups
Composite order bilinear groups were first introduced in [21] . We define a group generator G, an algorithm which takes a security parameter λ as input and outputs a description of a bilinear group G. In our case, we will have G output (N = p 1 p 2 p 3 , G, G T , e) where p 1 , p 2 , p 3 are distinct primes, G and G T are cyclic groups of order N = p 1 p 2 p 3 , and e : G 2 → G T is a map such that:
Computing e(g, h) is also commonly referred to as "pairing" g with h.
We assume that the group operations in G and G T as well as the bilinear map e are computable in polynomial time with respect to λ, and that the group descriptions of G and G T include generators of the respective cyclic groups. We let G p1 , G p2 , and G p3 denote the subgroups of order p 1 , p 2 , and p 3 in G respectively. We note that when h i ∈ G pi and h j ∈ G pj for i = j, e(h i , h j ) is the identity element in G T . To see this, suppose we have h 1 ∈ G p1 and h 2 ∈ G p2 . Let g denote a generator of G. Then, g p1p2 generates G p3 , g p1p3 generates G p2 , and g p2p3 generates G p1 . Hence, for some
This orthogonality property of G p1 , G p2 , G p3 is a useful feature of composite order bilinear groups which we leverage in our constructions and proofs. If we let g 1 , g 2 , g 3 denote generators of the subgroups G p1 , G p2 , and G p3 respectively, then every element h in G can be expressed as h = g c 3 for some a, b, c ∈ Z N . We refer to g 1 as the "G p1 part" or "G p1 component" of h. If we say that an h has no G p2 component, for example, we mean that b ≡ 0 mod p 2 . Below, we will often use g to denote an element of G p1 (as opposed to writing g 1 ).
The original Camenisch-Lysyanskaya scheme and BGOY identity-based sequential aggregate signature scheme both use prime order bilinear groups, i.e. groups G and G T are each of prime order q with an efficiently computable bilinear map e : G 2 → G T .
Camenisch-Lysyanskaya Signatures
Now we use the dual form framework to prove security of a signature scheme similar to the one put forward by Camenisch and Lysyanskaya [29] . The Camenisch-Lysyanskaya signature scheme was already shown to be secure under the LRSW assumption. However, the scheme can be naturally adapted to our framework, allowing us to prove security under static, non-interactive assumptions. Our result is not strictly comparable to the result under the LRSW assumption because our signature scheme is not identical to the original. However, this is the first proof of security for a scheme similar to the Camenisch-Lysyanskaya signature scheme from static, non-interactive assumptions.
Our signature scheme will use bilinear groups, G and G T , of composite order N = p 1 p 2 p 3 , where p 1 , p 2 , and p 3 are all distinct primes. Our construction is identical to the original Camenisch-Lysyanskaya signature scheme in the G p1 subgroup, but with additional components in the subgroups G p2 and G p3 . The signatures produced by the Sign A algorithm will have random components in G p3 and components in G p2 which mirror the structure of the scheme in G p1 . The signatures produced by the Sign B algorithm will have random components in both G p2 and G p3 . Type I forgeries are those that are distributed exactly like Sign A signatures in the G p2 subgroup, while Type II forgeries encompass all other distributions.
To prove dual-oracle invariance, we develop a backdoor verification test that the simulator can use to determine the type of the attacker's forgery. We leverage the fact that the simulator will know the discrete logarithms of the public parameters, which will allow it to strip off the components in G p1 in the forgery and check the distribution of the G p2 components. This check will fail to determine the type correctly only with negligible probability. In more detail, we create a simulator which must solve a subgroup decision problem and ascertain whether an element T is in G p1p3 or in the full group G. It will use T to create a challenge signature which is either distributed as an output of the Sign A algorithm or as an output of the Sign B algorithm, depending on the nature of T . It will be unable to determine the nature of this signature for itself because this will fall into the negligible error space of its backdoor verification test. When the simulator receives a forgery from the attacker, it will perform the backdoor verification test and correctly determine the type of the forgery, unless the attacker manages to produce a forgery for which this test fails. This will occur only with negligible probability, because the attacker will have only limited information about the error space from the challenge signature, and it needs to forge on a different message. This is possible because the public parameters are in G p1 , and so reveal no information about the error space of the backdoor test modulo p 2 . We use a pairwise independent argument to show that the limited amount of information the attacker can glean from the challenge signature on a message m is insufficient for it to produce a forgery for a different message m * that causes the backdoor test to err.
Our Dual Form Scheme
KeyGen(λ): The key generation algorithm chooses two groups, G = g and G T , of order N = p 1 p 2 p 3 (where p 1 , p 2 , and p 3 are all distinct primes of length λ) that have a non-degenerate, efficiently computable bilinear map, e :
, and x, y, x e , y e ∈ Z N . It sets SK = (x, y, x e , y e , g 3 , g 2,3 ),
Sign A (SK, m): Given a secret key (x, y, x e , y e , g 3 , g 2,3 ), a public key (N, G, g, X, Y ), and a message m ∈ Z * N , the algorithm chooses a random r, r ∈ Z N , R 2,3 ∈ G p2p3 , and random R 3 , R 3 , and R 3 ∈ G p3 , and outputs the signature
Note that the random elements of G p3 can be obtained by raising g 3 to random exponents modulo N . Likewise, the random elements of G p2p3 can be obtained by raising g 2,3 to random exponents modulo N . The random exponents modulo N will be uncorrelated modulo p 2 and modulo p 3 by the Chinese Remainder Theorem.
Sign B (SK, m): Given a secret key (x, y, x e , y e , g 3 , g 2,3 ), a public key (N, G, g, X, Y ), and a message m ∈ Z * N , the algorithm chooses a random r ∈ Z N and random R 2,3 , R 2,3 , and R 2,3 ∈ G p2p3 , and outputs the signature
The random elements can be generated in the same way as in Sign A .
Verify(VK, m, σ): Given a public key pk = (N, G, g, X, Y ), message m = 0, and a signature σ = (σ 1 , σ 2 , σ 3 ), the verification algorithm checks that:
(which ensures that σ 1 ∈ G p2p3 ), and
) and e(X, σ 1 ) · e(X, σ 2 ) m = e(g, σ 3 ).
As in the original CL scheme, messages must be chosen from Z * N , so that m = 0. If we allow m = 0, then an adversary can easily forge a valid signature using the public key elements (g, Y, X). Also like the original scheme, the Verify algorithm will not accept a signature where all the elements are the identity in G p1 . It suffices to check that the first element is not the identity in G p1 and that the other verification equations are satisfied. If σ 1 is the identity in G p1 , then it will be an element of the subgroup G p2p3 . To determine if σ 1 ∈ G p2p3 , we pair σ 1 with the public key element g under the bilinear map and verify that it does not equal the identity in G T . Without this check, a signature where all three elements are members of the subgroup G p2p3 would be valid for any message with the randomness r = 0 mod p 1 .
Notice, until Sign A is called, no information about the exponents x e and y e is given out. Once Sign A is called, these exponents behave exactly like the secret key exponents x and y, except in the G p2 subgroup. These exponents will be used to verify that a forgery is of Type I. The additional randomization with the G p3 elements guarantees that there will be no correlation in the G p3 subgroup between the three signature elements. Unlike the signatures given out by the Sign A algorithm, signatures from the Sign B algorithm will be completely randomized in the G p2 subgroup as well.
Forgery Classes We will divide verifiable forgeries according to their correlation in the G p2 subgroup, similar to the way we have defined the signatures from the Sign A and Sign B algorithms. We let z be an exponent in Z N . By the Chinese Remainder Theorem, we can represent z as an ordered tuple (z 1 , z 2 , z 3 ) ∈ Z p1 × Z p2 × Z p3 , where z 1 = z mod p 1 , z 2 = z mod p 2 , and z 3 = z mod p 3 . Letting (z 1 , z 2 , z 3 ) = (0 mod p 1 , 1 mod p 2 , 0 mod p 3 ) and g 2 be a generator of G p2 , we define the forgery classes as follows:
, and (σ *
Essentially, Type I forgeries will be correlated in the G p2 subgroup exactly in the same way as they are correlated in the G p1 subgroup, with the exponents x e and y e playing the same role in the G p2 subgroup that x and y play in the G p1 subgroup. Type I forgeries will align with the Sign A algorithm, to guarantee that our scheme is A-I matching. Type II forgeries include any other verifiable signatures, i.e. those not correctly correlated in the G p2 subgroup. Unlike the signatures produced by the Sign B algorithm, Type II forgeries need not be completely random in the G p2 subgroup. However, we will show in our proof of security that this is enough to guarantee B-II matching.
Complexity Assumptions
We now state our complexity assumptions. We let G and G T denote two cyclic groups of order N = p 1 p 2 p 3 , where p 1 , p 2 , and p 3 are distinct primes, and e : G 2 → G T is an efficient, non-degenerate bilinear map. In addition, we will denote the subgroup of G of order p 1 p 2 as G p1p2 , for example.
The first two of these assumptions were introduced in [56] , where it is proven that these assumptions hold in the generic group model, assuming it is hard to find a non-trivial factor of the group order, N . These are specific instances of the General Subgroup Decision Assumption described in [13] . The third assumption is new, and in Appendix B we prove that it also holds in the generic group model, assuming it is hard to find a non-trivial factor of the group order, N . Assumption 4.1. Given a group generator G, we define the following distribution:
We define the advantage of an algorithm, A, in breaking Assumption 4.1 to be: 
We define the advantage of an algorithm, A, in breaking Assumption 4.2 to be:
Definition 2. We say that G satisfies Assumption 4.2 if for any polynomial time algorithm, A, Adv
is a negligible function of λ. Assumption 4.3. Given a group generator G, we define the following distribution:
We define the advantage of an algorithm, A, in breaking Assumption 4.3 to be:
where R 3 and R 3 are any values in the subgroup G p3 .
Definition 3. We say that G satisfies Assumption 4.3 if for any polynomial time algorithm, A, Adv
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A (λ) is a negligible function of λ.
Proof of Security
We will show that our signature scheme is secure under these assumptions by showing that it satisfies the three properties of a secure dual form signature scheme.
Lemma 4.1. If Assumption 4.1 holds, then our signature scheme is A-I matching.
Proof. Suppose that there exists an attacker, A, that can create a Type II forgery (i.e. a non-Type I forgery) with probability given access to an oracle for the Sign A algorithm. Then we can create an algorithm B that breaks Assumption 4.1 with advantage .
B first receives g, X 1 X 2 , X 3 , T . B chooses random exponents x, y ∈ Z N and passes (g, g x , g y ) to A. B then acts as an oracle for the Sign A algorithm, using (x, y, X 3 ) as the secret key, where x e = x and y e = y. Note that by the Chinese Remainder Theorem, x mod p 1 and x mod p 2 are uncorrelated, so the value x modulo p 1 will not be correlated to the value of x e modulo p 2 , and likewise, y modulo p 1 will not be correlated to y e modulo p 2 . Also, notice that B does not actually need to know the secret key element in G p2p3 because it will be able to simulate the Sign A algorithm without it.
To sign a message m, B chooses random exponents r, t, u, v ∈ Z N and returns
A produces a forgery (m * , σ * ), where
. First B must check that Verify(m * , σ * ) = 'true', if not then B will abort. In addition, B must verify that it has received a Type II forgery. To do this, B can check the correlation in both the G p2 components by pairing each signature element with X 1 X 2 as follows. It checks if:
If and only if (m * , σ * ) is a Type I forgery, both of these equations will hold. Therefore, if both of these are true, then B will abort. Notice that B can only create Type I forgeries, and it needs the output of A to be a Type II forgery in order to defeat the Assumption 4.1 challenger.
Finally, if one or both of these equations fail, B will be guaranteed that it has a Type II forgery, which it can use to determine what subgroup T is in. B can simply use T in place of X 1 X 2 in the previous two equations and checks if:
By the contrapositive of the previous argument, since (m * , σ * ) is a Type II forgery, if T ∈ G p1p2 , then one of these equations must fail. On the other hand, since the forgery must be verifiable, if T ∈ G p1 , the G p2 components will not affect the bilinear map and the correlation will correctly hold in the G p1 components. Thus, if (m * , σ * ) ∈ V II then B can determine what subgroup T is in with probability 1. Hence, if A succeeds in creating a Type II forgery with non-negligible probability , then B can achieve a non-negligible advantage against Assumption 4.1. Proof. Suppose that there exists an attacker, A, that can break dual-oracle invariance with a non-negligible advantage. Then we can create an algorithm B that breaks Assumption 4.2 with non-negligible advantage.
B receives G, g, X 1 X 2 , X 3 , Y 2 Y 3 , T . B chooses random exponents x, y, x e , y e ∈ Z N and sets SK = (x, y, x e , y e , X 3 , Y 2 Y 3 ) and P K = (G, g, X = g x , Y = g y ). Using the secret key, B can answer queries from A to either oracle, by simply deciding whether to randomize the second two pieces of the signature in the G p2 subgroup.
For a query, m, to the Sign A oracle, B chooses r, r , t, u, v ∈ Z N and responds with:
For query, m, to the Sign B oracle, B chooses r, t, u, v ∈ Z N and responds with:
Finally, for the challenge message, m, B chooses r, r , t, u, v ∈ Z N and returns:
, then B has correctly simulated the Sign A oracle on the challenge message, and If T ∈ G, then B has properly simulated the Sign B oracle. We will now argue that B can use the output of A to determine whether T has a G p2 component or not.
In order to use the output of A to determine which subgroup T belongs to, B must be able to determine whether A returns a Type I or a Type II forgery. First, B will check that A has not seen a signature for m * before and that the forgery (m * , σ * ) verifies correctly, if not then B will guess randomly. Next, B will try to distinguish between the two forgery types by checking the correlation in the G p2 components of the signature σ
. We call this our backdoor verification test. If we let g i be a generator of the subgroup G pi , we can rewrite the signature elements as follows:
where r, r , k 2 , k 3 , u, v, and w are all constants from Z N . From the definition of our forgery types, in this new representation, (m * , σ * ) is a Type I forgery if and only if k 2 = k 3 = 0. To determine if k 2 = k 3 = 0, first B will need to isolate the G p2 components of σ * 2 and σ * 3 by removing their G p1 components. We will refer to σ * 2 with its G p1 component removed as s 2 , and σ * 3 with its G p1 component removed as s 3 . B is able to find s 2 and s 3 by using the known correlation in the G p1 components as follows:
where v = v − uy and w = w − u(x + m * xy). These constants will be unimportant since we only care about the correlation in the G p2 components. Next, we will use the expected correlation for a Type I forgery in the G p2 components of s 2 and s 3 to try remove them from the remaining G p3 components. Let
where w = w − c * v . Finally, B will check if s is indeed an element of G p3 by computing the pairing of s with X 1 X 2 and checking if it is the identity element in G T ,
Clearly, if (m * , σ * ) is a Type I forgery, then k 2 = k 3 = 0, so s ∈ G p3 . However, s will be an element of G p3 as long as k 3 − c * k 2 = 0 mod p 2 . This gives us the criterion for a Type II forgery to pass this backdoor verification test. In fact, notice that our challenge signature will meet exactly this requirement, regardless of what subgroup T is in. This is important, because it means that B cannot break the assumption without the output of A.
We claim that an attacker can only create a Type II forgery that satisfies this criterion with negligible probability. We know that in a Type II forgery, k 2 or k 3 will be nonzero. However, in order to pass the backdoor verification test, if k 2 or k 3 is nonzero, they both must be nonzero. Thus, the attacker must be able to produce a forgery with exponents k 2 
where g i is a generator for the subgroup G pi . Finally, if we define the three exponents of the three challenge signature elements to be a 1 , a 2 , a 3 , respectively, then the equations available to the attacker are t 2 r + y 2 r = a 1 (1)
t 2 r(x + mxy) + y 2 r (x e + mx e y e ) = a 3 .
Recall that all these equations hold modulo p 2 . We will argue that from these equations, an attacker has only a negligible chance of implicitly determining c * = (x e + m * x e y e ) − (x + m * xy) y e − y .
We will relabel some of our variables by defining s := t 2 r + y 2 r , v := t 2 r (which are distributed uniformly randomly). We can then rewrite our three equations as:
sy e + v(y − y e ) = a 2 s(x e + mx e y e ) + v(x − x e + m(xy − x e y e )) = a 3 . Now, information-theoretically, the attacker knows the values of a 1 , a 2 , a 3 , x e , y e , m, so it additionally learns the values v(y − y e ) and v(x − x e + m(xy − x e y e )) here, and nothing more. We introduce one more change of variable, setting v := v(y − y e ), b := v(x − x e ), and d := v(xy − x e y e ). We argue that the joint distribution of v , b, d modulo p 2 is negligibly close to the uniform distribution on Z triple of values for v , b, d in Z p2 (with x e , y e fixed), one can (almost always) solve uniquely for v, x, y as:
With all but negligible probability, the denominators will be invertible. Now, information-theoretically, the
* . This non-trivial factor can be used to break Assumption 4.2 with non-negligible advantage, as proven in [56] . Thus, we may assume that m = m * modulo p 2 , except with negligible probability.
Since the attacker has a negligible chance of creating a Type II forgery that will pass the backdoor verification test, if the forgery does pass, then with probability negligibly close to 1, it must be a Type I forgery. We already know that if the forgery fails the test, it must be a Type II forgery. Therefore, B will be able to determine the forgery type with probability negligibly close to 1, and thus can break Assumption 4.2 with non-negligible advantage. Proof. Suppose that there exists an attacker, A, that can create a Type I forgery with non-negligible probability given access to an oracle for the Sign B algorithm. Then we can create an algorithm B that breaks Assumption 4.3 with probability negligibly close to .
B first receives g, g a , g r X 2 , g ra X 2 , g ra 2 X 2 , Z 2 , X 3 . B chooses random exponents b, x e , y e ∈ Z N , and sets
) and SK = (x = a, y = ab, x e , y e , X 3 , Z 2 X 3 ). Clearly, B does not know a, so parts of the secret key are set implicitly. Also, notice that the exponents x and y are distributed uniformly at random modulo p 1 .
B can now simulate the Sign B oracle. If A queries on a message m, B choosesr, u 2 , v 2 , w 2 , u 3 , v 3 , w 3 ∈ Z N and signs,
3 ). The G p1 components of the signature will all have the correct correlation, where x = a and y = ab and the randomness is rr. Also, it is easy to verify that the G p2 and the G p3 components will all appear uniformly distributed.
After it has finished making queries, A will return a forgery (m * , σ * ). First B will check that (m * , σ * ) verifies, and if not B will abort. Then, B must check that (m * , σ * ) is a Type I forgery. To do this, B can compute
(σ * 1 ) xe+m * xeye . It then checks if e(s 2 , Z 2 ) = 1 = e(s 3 , Z 2 ). If these checks pass, then it is a Type I forgery. Otherwise, it is a Type II forgery, and B will abort.
However, with non-negligible probability , A will return a Type I forgery. This implies that the forgery has the correct correlation in x e and y e modulo p 2 . We observe that x e and y e are information-theoretically hidden from A. Therefore, A can only produce a Type I forgery with the correct correlation in x e and y e and nonzero G p2 components with negligible probability, say δ . Thus, with probability at least − δ , B will receive a Type I forgery that has no G p2 components. This would mean creating a signature of the form:
If A returns a forgery of this type and r = 0 mod p 1 , then B can return,
where w = Thus, with probability at least − δ , the forgery returned will allow B to defeat the Assumption 4.3 challenger. Therefore, B will be successful in defeating the Assumption 4.3 challenger with probability negligibly close to .
BGOY Signatures
Here we give a public key variant of the BGOY signatures and prove existential unforgeability using our dual form framework. In Appendix A, we show how this base scheme can be built into an identity-based sequential aggregate signature scheme and reduce the security of the aggregate scheme to the security of this base scheme, in the random oracle model. We will also employ the random oracle model in our proof for the base scheme, although this use of the random oracle can be removed (see below for discussion of this).
Our techniques here are quite different than those employed for the BB-derived and CL signature variants, and they reflect the different structure of this scheme. There are some basic commonalities, however: we again employ a bilinear group of order N = p 1 p 2 p 3 , and the main structure of the scheme occurs in the G p1 subgroup. The signatures produced by the Sign A algorithm contain group elements which are only in G p1 , while the signatures produced by the Sign B algorithm additionally have components in G p3 . These components in G p3 are not fully randomized each time and do not occur on all signature elements: they occur only on three signature elements, and the ratio between two of their exponents is the same for all Sign B signatures. Our forgery types will be defined in terms of the subgroups present on two of the elements in the forgery.
We design our proof to reflect the structure of the scheme, which essentially combines a one-time signature with a mechanism to prevent an attacker from producing new signatures from linear combinations of old signatures in the exponent. In proving dual-oracle invariance, we leverage these structures by first changing the challenge signature from an output of Sign A to a signature that has components in G p2 , and then changing it to an output of Sign B . It is crucial to note that as we proceed through this intermediary step, the challenge signature is the only signature which has any non-zero components in G p2 . This allows us to argue that as we make this transition, an attacker cannot change from producing Type I forgeries (which do not have G p2 components on certain elements) to producing forgeries which do have non-zero G p2 components in the relevant locations. Intuitively, such an attacker would violate the combination of one-time security and inability to combine signatures, since the attacker has only received one signature with G p2 elements, and it cannot combine this with any other signatures to produce a forgery on a new message. These aspects seem hard to capture when working directly in a prime order rather than composite order group. (We note, however, that the one-time aspect was also implicit in the security proof of the Gentry-Ramzan scheme [42] on which the BGOY scheme was based; however, differences in the schemes prevent capturing it in the same way for the latter.) The techniques here are also quite different from those used in our proofs for CL and BB-derived signatures: here there is no backdoor verification test or pairwise-independence argument.
The Dual Form Scheme
KeyGen(λ) → VK, SK The key generation algorithm chooses a bilinear group G of order N = p 1 p 2 p 3 . It chooses two random elements g, k ∈ G p1 , random elements g 3 , g d 3 ∈ G p3 , and random exponents a 1 , a 2 , b 1 , b 2 , α 1 , α 2 , β 1 , β 2 ∈ Z N . It also chooses a function H : {0, 1} * → Z N which will be modeled as a random oracle. It sets the verification key as
and the secret key as SK :
Sign A (m, SK) → σ The Sign A algorithm takes in a message m ∈ {0, 1} * . It chooses two random exponents r 1 , r 2 ∈ Z N , and computes:
It outputs the signature σ := (σ 1 , σ 2 , σ 3 , σ 4 , σ 5 ).
Sign B (m, SK) → σ The Sign B algorithm takes in a message m ∈ {0, 1} * . It chooses two random exponents r 1 , r 2 , x, y ∈ Z N , and computes:
Verify(m, σ, VK) → {T rue, F alse} The verification algorithm first checks that:
It also checks that:
Finally, it checks that: e(g, σ 4 ) = e(k, σ 3 ).
If all of these checks pass, it outputs "True." Otherwise, it outputs "False."
We note that the use of the random oracle H to hash messages in {0, 1} * to elements in Z N in this public key scheme that forms the base of our identity-based sequential aggregate signatures is not necessary, and can be replaced in the following way. Instead of using g a1a2+H(m)b1b2 , we can assume our messages are n-bit strings (denoted m 1 m 2 . . . m n ) and use g a0b0 n i=1 g miaibi . Here, g a0 , . . . , g an , g b0 , . . . , g bn will be in the public verification key. In the proof, instead of guessing which random oracle query corresponds to the challenge message, the simulator will guess a bit which differs between the challenge message and the message that will be used in the forgery. This guess will be correct with non-negligible probability. However, the use of the random oracle model to prove security for the full identity-based sequential aggregate scheme is still required. Removing the random oracle model altogether remains an open problem.
Forgery Classes We will divide the forgery types based on whether they have any G p2 or G p3 components on σ 1 or σ 5 . We let z 2 ∈ Z N denote the exponent represented by the tuple (0 mod p 1 , 1 mod p 2 , 0 mod p 3 ), and we let z 3 ∈ Z N denote the exponent represented by the tuple (0 mod p 1 , 0 mod p 2 , 1 mod p 3 ). Then we can define the forgery classes as follows:
In other words, Type I forgeries have σ * 1 , σ * 5 ∈ G p1 , while Type II forgeries have a non-zero component in G p3 or G p2 on at least one of these terms. We note that these types are disjoint and exhaustive.
Complexity Assumptions
We now state the static complexity assumptions which we will use to prove security of our scheme. The first is a weaker version of Assumption 4.1 stated in Section 4.2. (Here, we do not give out the X 1 X 2 term.) The third is another instance of the General Subgroup Decision assumption [13] , and was previously used in [57] (where it was also proven to hold in the generic group model, assuming it is hard to find a non-trivial factor of the group order). The second and fourth assumptions are new, and we prove in Appendix B that they hold in the generic group model, assuming it is hard to find a non-trivial factor of the group order, N . Assumption 5.1. Given a group generator G, we define the following distribution:
We define the advantage of an algorithm, A, in breaking Assumption 5.1 to be: Assumption 5.2. Given a group generator G, we define the following distribution:
Given D, we assume it is hard to produce group elements s 1 , s 2 , s 3 ∈ G such that e(s 1 , g)/e(s 2 , s 3 ) = e(g c1 , g c2 ) and s 1 has a non-zero component in G p2 . More formally, we let z 2 ∈ Z N denote the exponent represented by the tuple (0 mod p 1 , 1 mod p 2 , 0 mod p 3 ) and we define the advantage of an algorithm, A, in breaking Assumption 5.2 to be: We note that without the requirement of a non-zero G p2 component on s 1 , this is easy -set s 1 = 1, s 2 = g c1 , s 3 = g −c2 . Perhaps surprisingly, we are able to use the above simple assumption to in some sense capture both the "one-time" security of the BGOY scheme and its mechanism to prevent taking linear combinations of old signatures to prevent forgeries. We discuss this more in Section 5.3 where the assumption is used. Assumption 5.3. Given a group generator G, we define the following distribution:
We define the advantage of an algorithm, A, in breaking Assumption 5.3 to be: Assumption 5.4. Given a group generator G, we define the following distribution:
Given D, we assume it is hard to compute g c1c2 . More formally, We define the advantage of an algorithm, A, in breaking Assumption 5.4 to be:
Definition 7. We say that G satisfies Assumption 5.4 if for any polynomial time algorithm, A, Adv
5.4
For the identity-based, aggregate version of our scheme, we will need one more assumption which is again an instance of the General Subgroup Decision assumption. This is weaker than the Assumption 1 appearing in [57] .
Assumption 5.5. Given a group generator G, we define the following distribution:
We define the advantage of an algorithm, A, in breaking Assumption 5.3 to be: 
Proof of Security
We now prove that our scheme has the A-I matching, dual-oracle invariance, and B-II matching properties, when H is modeled as a random oracle.
Lemma 5.1. Under Assumption 5.1, our scheme is A-I matching.
Proof. We assume there exists a PPT attacker A which violates the A-I matching property. We will use A to create a PPT algorithm B which breaks Assumption 5.1 (either the way it is written, or with the roles of p 2 and p 3 interchanged). B receives g, T (we will not need the g 3 term here, so we ignore it). B chooses random exponents a 1 , a 2 , b 1 , b 2 , α 1 , α 2 , β 1 , β 2 , v ∈ Z N . It sets the verification key as:
For this portion of the proof, the random oracle is not really needed, so we can think of H as a publicly available function here or just have B choose random responses to the random oracle queries and remember its answers to maintain consistency. It is also easy for the simulator to respond to A's signing queries by calling the Sign A algorithm, since it knows all of the secret key needed in the Sign A algorithm.
With non-negligible probability, A produces a forgery (σ * 1 , . . . , σ * 5 ), m * that is not of Type I (i.e it is of Type II). This means that either σ * 1 or σ * 5 has a non-zero component in G p2 or G p3 . We let h * denote H(m * ). Whenever it receives a valid forgery, B computes:
Since the forgery verifies correctly, this S has a zero G p1 component. With non-negligible probability, S will have a non-zero G p2 or G p3 component, since there is a non-zero G p2 or G p3 component on at least one of σ * 1 and σ * 5 whenever A produces a forgery that is not of Type I. We note that two non-zero G p2 or G p3 components will cancel out in the computation of S only with negligible probability, because the value of v modulo p 2 and p 3 is information-theoretically hidden from A.
Either S will have a non-zero G p2 component with non-negligible probability, or S will have a non-zero G p3 component with non-negligible probability. If the former happens, we will break Assumption 5.1 as it is written, by having B compute e(T, S). If the result is 1, then B guesses randomly. If the result if not 1, then B knows that T ∈ G p1p2 . Thus, it achieves non-negligible advantage against Assumption 5.1. If S instead has a G p3 component with non-negligible probability, then we break Assumption 5.1 with the roles of p 2 and p 3 interchanged in the same fashion.
To prove dual-oracle invariance, we first define an intermediary security game. We let Game A denote the dual-oracle security game where the challenge signature is produced by calling the Sign A algorithm, and we let Game B denote the dual-oracle security game where the challenge signature is produced by calling the Sign B algorithm. We now define:
Game M id This is like Game A and Game B except that the challenge signature is distributed as:
where R 2 , R 2 , R 2 are random elements of G p2 .
We now prove:
Lemma 5.2. Under Assumption 5.1, for any PPT A, its probability of producing a forgery which has a non-zero component in G p3 on either σ * 1 or σ * 5 is only negligibly different between Game A and Game M id . Also, its total probability of producing a forgery is only negligibly different between Game A and Game M id .
Proof. We assume there exists a PPT attacker A which achieves a non-negligible difference either in its probability of producing a forgery at all or in its probability of producing a forgery which has non-zero component in G p3 between Game A and Game M id . We will create a PPT algorithm B which breaks Assumption 5.1. B receives g, g 3 , T , where T is either in G p1 or G p1p2 . It will simulate either Game A or Game M id with A, depending on the value of T .
It chooses random exponents a 1 , a 2 , b 1 , b 2 , α 1 , α 2 , β 1 , β 2 , v ∈ Z N and forms the verification key as:
As in the proof of the previous lemma, modeling H as a random oracle is not needed here, so we can think of H as a public function for this step, or simply imagine that B chooses random responses to the random oracle queries and remembers its answers for consistency. Since B knows all of the G p1 elements in the secret key, it can call the Sign A algorithm to produce signatures. It also chooses d ∈ Z N randomly and sets the rest of the secret key as g 3 , g d 3 so it can call the Sign B algorithm to produce signatures as well. To produce the challenge signature on a message m with H(m) denoted by h, the simulator chooses a random r 2 ∈ Z N and implicitly sets g r1 to be the G p1 part of T . It forms the challenge signature as:
If T ∈ G p1 , this is identically distributed to the outcome of calling the Sign A algorithm, so B has properly simulated Game A in this case. If T ∈ G p1p2 , then the G p2 components on σ 1 , σ 2 , and σ 5 are uniformly random here, since r 2 and v are random modulo p 2 . In this case, B has properly simulated Game M id . B can always perform the verification test to check whether or not A has produced a valid forgery. Now, when A has produced a forgery, B tests if σ * 1 , σ * 5 have any G p3 components by pairing each with g 3 . We note that one of σ * 1 , σ * 5 has a non-zero G p3 component if and only if one of the pairings e(σ * 1 , g 3 ), e(σ * 5 , g 3 ) does not yield the group identity. Thus, B can observe when A is forging, and also when it is producing a forgery with with a non-zero G p3 component on either of σ * 1 , σ * 5 . Thus, B can use the non-negligible difference in A's probability of satisfying whichever one of these conditions to achieve a non-negligible advantage against Assumption 5.1.
We next prove dual oracle invariance with respect to forgeries (σ * 1 , . . . , σ * 5 ) having a non-zero G p2 component on σ * 1 or σ * 5 . This is where we use Assumption 5.2. As we mentioned, this will in some sense capture both the "one-time" security of the BGOY scheme as well as its mechanism to prevent the adversary from taking linear combinations of old signatures to create forgeries.
We give a bit more intuition about how this is possible. For simplicity, let's ignore the last two elements of the signature (i.e., corresponding exactly to the original scheme [15] ) and and consider forgeries having non-zero G p2 component on σ * 1 ; the remaining signature elements are not used in an essential way here. Intuitively, we set up the simulation by embedding g c1 , g c2 in the assumption into g a1 , g a2 , g b1 , g b2 in the verification key of the scheme so that, to answer a signing query, the simulator produces (σ 1 , σ 2 , σ 3 ) where the g c1c2 term embedded in σ 1 is cancelled out by g c1 , g c2 embedded in the σ 2 , σ 3 components. However, for exactly one signature, the g c1c2 term embedded in σ 1 already cancels out, which allows the simulator to embed X 1 X 2 into g r1r2 instead. Thus, the simulator can produce one signature with X 1 X 2 embedded in σ 1 , but (necessarily) no g c1c2 term. However, observe that if the adversary could take a linear combination of both kinds of signatures to produce a new one (or create one from scratch), this would have both g c1c2 and X 1 X 2 embedded in the first component, which is exactly the type of forgery we consider and could be used to contradict the assumption.
Lemma 5.3. Under Assumption 5.2, for any PPT A, its probability of producing a forgery which has a non-zero component in G p2 on either σ * 1 or σ * 5 is negligible in Game M id . Proof. We assume there exists a PPT attacker A who produces such a forgery with non-negligible probability in Game M id . We will create a PPT algorithm B which breaks Assumption 5.2. B is given g, g c1 , g c2 , g 3 , X 1 X 2 . B will simulate Game M id . Here, we will use that H is modeled as a random oracle. B first chooses a random value h ∈ Z N , which it wants to be H(m) for the challenge message m. However, B does not know what m will be at the start of the game, so it will guess which oracle query corresponds to the challenge message m and respond with h to this query (B artificially inserts a random oracle query on the challenge message once the challenge message is received in order to ensure that it queried at least once). It responds to all other random oracle queries by choosing a random value in Z N (unless the query is repeated, in which case, it repeats its previous response). Since the attacker A can only make a polynomial number of random oracle queries, B's guess will be correct with non-negligible probability. When the guess is incorrect, B will abort.
B chooses random exponents
It forms the verification key as:
The parameters b 1 , b 2 , α 1 , α 2 , β 1 , β 2 here are just used for re-randomization so that the parameters are properly distributed. The important thing to note is that a 1 a 2 + hb 1 b 2 and α 1 α 2 + hβ 1 β 2 will have no occurrences of c 1 c 2 , since these will cancel out. To respond to a Sign A query on a message m , B proceeds as follows. We let h denote H(m ). B chooses random values r 1 , r 2 ∈ Z N and implicitly sets r 1 = c 1 (h − h ) + r 1 , r 2 = −c 2 + r 2 . Since r 1 , r 2 are random, these are well-distributed. The term −c 1 c 2 (h − h ) in r 1 r 2 will be used to the cancel the c 1 c 2 terms arising from a 1 a 2 + h b 1 b 2 and α 1 α 2 + h β 1 β 2 . We note that
The signature is formed as:
To respond to Sign B queries, the simulator chooses a random d ∈ Z N and computes g For each query, it first forms a signature (σ 1 , . . . , σ 5 ) in G p1 as above, and adds on G p3 components by choosing random values x, y ∈ Z N and computing:
x .
It returns (σ 1 , . . . , σ 5 ), which is well-distributed as an output of the Sign B algorithm.
If the simulator has guessed correctly so that the challenge message m satisfies H(m) = h, then the simulator creates the challenge signature as follows (otherwise, it aborts). It leverages the fact that the c 1 c 2 terms in a 1 a 2 + hb 1 b 2 and α 1 α 2 + hβ 1 β 2 cancel, so it no longer needs to embed c 1 and c 2 into the r 1 and r 2 values. Instead, it chooses random exponents r 1 , r 2 ∈ Z N and implicitly sets g r1 to be X r 1
1 . It forms the signature as:
Note that since r 1 , r 2 , and v are all random modulo p 2 , the terms X are distributed randomly in G p2 . So B has properly simulated Game M id . It is crucial to note here that the simulator can only make this one signature with G p2 components -this is a reflection of both the underlying one-time security and the mechanism which prevents combining signatures. By the cancelation technique, the simulator can only sign this one message with p 2 components, and it cannot combine this with other signatures.
Since the event that A produces a forgery which has a non-zero G p2 component on σ * 1 or σ * 5 is independent of the event that B aborts, we have that with non-negligible probability, B does not abort and A produces such a forgery (m * , σ * ). We let h * denote H(m * ). When B receives a forgery, it computes:
This strips off the extra randomizing terms, and the remaining G p1 parts of the forgery must be of the form:
for some r 1 , r 2 ∈ Z N . Now, if σ 1 also has a non-zero G p2 component, then B can compute:
and we then have that e(g, s 1 )/e(s 2 , s 3 ) = e(g c1 , g c2 ),
and s 1 has a non-zero G p2 component, so this breaks Assumption 5.2. We note that either s 2 or s 3 might also have a non-zero G p2 component, but both cannot have non-zero G p2 components, since the original forgery (m * , σ * ) verifies. If instead σ 5 has a non-zero G p2 component, then B can compute:
which will satisfy e(g, s 1 )/e(s 2 , s 3 ) = e(g c1 , g c2 ),
and s 1 has non-zero G p2 component. Hence, since at least one of these two events must occur with nonnegligible probability, B can break Assumption 5.2 with non-negligible probability.
By Lemma 5.2, we see that a PPT attacker must have the same overall probability of forging in Game A versus Game M id , up to a negligible difference. By A-I matching, it can only produce Type I forgeries in Game A with non-negligible probability. By lemmas 5.2 and 5.3, we see that a PPT attacker cannot start producing forgeries of Type II with non-negligible probability as we move from Game A to Game M id . This allows us to conclude that any PPT attacker's probability of producing a Type I forgery must differ only negligibly between Game A and Game M id . We now show that the same holds for the transition from Game M id to Game B , and dual-oracle invariance then follows.
Lemma 5.4. Under Assumption 5.3, for any PPT attacker, its probability of producing a Type I forgery is only negligibly different between Game M id and Game B .
Proof. We assume there exists a PPT attacker A which achieves a non-negligibly different probability of producing a Type I forgery between Game M id and Game B . We will use this to create a PPT algorithm B which breaks Assumption 5.3. B is given g, X 1 X 3 , Y 2 Y 3 , T , and its task is to determine if T ∈ G p1p3 or T ∈ G p1p2 . It will simulate either Game M id or Game B with A, depending on the value of T . It will use the term Y 2 Y 3 to test if A is produces a Type I forgery.
B chooses random exponents a 1 , a 2 , b 1 , b 2 , α 1 , α 2 , β 1 , β 2 , v ∈ Z N and sets the verification key as:
For this stage of the proof, modeling H as a random oracle is not needed, so we can again think of H as a public function for this step, or simply imagine that B chooses random responses to the random oracle queries and remembers its answers for consistency. Since B knows all of the G p1 elements in the secret key, it can call the Sign A algorithm to produce signatures. To produce signatures which are properly distributed as outputs of the Sign B algorithm, B proceeds as follows. To sign a message m with H(m ) = h , it chooses random exponents r 1 , r 2 ∈ Z N and implicitly sets g r1 equal to X r 1
1 . It will implicitly set the value d in the Sign B algorithm equal to the value of v modulo p 3 (this is uncorrelated from the verification key, which only involves the value of v modulo p 1 ). It forms the signature as:
This produces signatures identically distributed to outputs of the Sign B algorithm. To produce the challenge signature for a message m with H(m) = h, B chooses a random exponent r 2 ∈ Z N and implicitly sets g r1 equal to the G p1 component of T . It forms the signature as:
If T ∈ G p1p3 , this produces a signature identically distributed to an output of the Sign B algorithm. If T ∈ G p1p2 , this produces a signature whose G p2 components on σ 1 , σ 2 , and σ 5 are uniformly random, since r 2 and v are random modulo p 2 . (Note that the value of v modulo p 2 is not involved in either the verification key or the Sign B signatures.) Thus, if T ∈ G p1p3 , then B has properly simulated Game B , and if T ∈ G p1p2 , then B has properly simulated Game M id . When B receives a forgery (m * , σ * ) from A, it can test whether the forgery is of Type I or not by computing e(Y 2 Y 3 , σ * 1 ) and e(Y 2 Y 3 , σ * 5 ). The forgery is of Type I if and only if both of these pairings produce the identity element. Hence, B can leverage the non-negligible difference in A's probability of producing a Type I forgery to achieve non-negligible advantage against Assumption 5.3. This completes our proof of dual-oracle invariance. Finally, we prove our scheme is B-II matching.
Lemma 5.5. Under Assumption 5.4, our scheme is B-II matching.
Proof. We assume there exists a PPT attacker A who produces a non-Type II forgery (i.e. a Type I forgery) with non-negligible probability when it is only given signatures produced by the Sign B algorithm. We will create a PPT algorithm B which breaks Assumption 5.4. B is given g, g c1 , g c2 , g c1c2 X 3 , g 3 . It chooses random exponents b 1 , b 2 , α 1 , α 2 , β 1 , β 2 ∈ Z N . It implicitly sets a 1 = c 1 and a 2 = c 2 . It forms the verification key as:
As for many of the previous steps,, modeling H as a random oracle is not necessary here, so we can again think of H as a public function for this step, or simply imagine that B chooses random responses to the random oracle queries and remembers its answers for consistency.
To produce a signature for a message m with H(m) = h, B proceeds as follows. It chooses a random value d ∈ Z N which will be fixed for all signatures. For each signature, it chooses fresh random values r 1 , r 2 . It will implicitly set g r1 as (g c1c2 )
(Note the v − d and r 2 are invertible modulo N with all but negligible probability.) Since r 1 , r 2 are random, this makes r 1 , r 2 also randomly distributed, as required. It also chooses random values t, y ∈ Z N . It computes the signature as:
To see that the G p3 parts are well distributed, note that the ratio between the exponents of X 3 is equal to d:
This equality is the reason we have used the value d/(v − d). To see how we arrived at this choice of parameters, let the variable r denote the coefficient of g c1c2 X 3 inside g r1r2 . To make the G p1 parts welldistributed and make the ratio between the X 3 exponents equal to d simultaneously, we need r to satisfy:
Solving for r, we obtain r = d/(v − d), which is the value we have used above. The extra terms g ensure that the G p3 components on σ 1 and σ 5 are random up to having this fixed ratio, and the g y 3 term ensures that the G p3 component of σ 2 is always uniformly random. Thus, B is producing signatures which are identically distributed to outputs of Sign B .
When A produces a forgery (m * , σ * ) where H(m * ) = h * , B computes the quantities:
Then, B computes:
If A has produced Type I forgery (i.e. σ * 1 , σ * 5 ∈ G p1 ), then this quantity is equal to g c1c2 . Since this happens with non-negligible probability, B breaks Assumption 5.4.
A.1 Syntax and Security Definitions
We recall from [15] that an identity-based sequential aggregate signature (IBSAS) scheme consists of four algorithms:
The setup algorithm takes as input the unary encoding of security parameter λ and outputs the public parameters PP and master secret key MK.
KeyDer(MK, I) → SK I The key derivation algorithm takes as input the master key K and an identity I, and outputs a signing key SK I . I , m, ((I 1 , m 1 ) , . . . , (I i , m i ) ), σ ) → σ The sequential aggregate signing algorithm takes as input a signing key SK I , a message m, a list of identity-message pairs (I 1 , m 1 ) , . . . , (I i , m i ) for i ∈ Z + , and an aggregate signature σ , and outputs a new aggregate signature σ or ⊥. ((I 1 , m n ) , . . . , (I n , m n )), σ) → {T rue, F alse} The aggregate verification algorithm takes as input public parameters PP, a list of identity-message pairs (I 1 , m 1 ) , . . . , (I n , m n ) for n ∈ Z + , and an aggregate signature σ, and outputs "True" or "False."
AggSign(SK

AggVerify(PP,
The scheme is required to be correct, meaning that for any n ∈ Z + and list of identity-message pairs (I 1 , m 1 ) , . . . , (I n , m n ), the aggregate verification algorithm when run on PP, ((I 1 , m n ) , . . . , (I n , m n )), σ n outputs "True," for any PP, σ n generated as follows. We first generate PP, MK by running the setup algorithm on 1 λ . For i = 1 to n we generate σ i by running the aggregate signing algorithm run on inputs SK Ii , m i , ((I 1 , m 1 ) , . . . , (I i−1 , m i−1 )), σ i−1 , where σ 0 is empty and each SK Ii is itself generated by running the key derivation algorithm on inputs MK, I i . Now, the security definition for an IBSAS scheme considers a challenger interacting with an adversary against the scheme as follows:
Setup The challenger runs the Setup algorithm to generate public parameters PP and master secret key MK. It gives PP to the adversary.
Attack Phase The adversary may issue "CreateKey" and "Aggregate" queries to the challenger. For a "CreateKey" query, the adversary provides an identity I, and the challenger responds with a signing key SK I it generates by running the key derivation algorithm on inputs MK and I. For an "Aggregate" query, the adversary provides an identity I, a message m, a list of identity-message pairs (I 1 , m 1 ) , . . . , (I i , m i ) for any i ∈ Z + of the adversary's choosing, and an aggregate signature σ . The challenger responds with an aggregate signature σ it generates by running the aggregate signing algorithm on SK I (itself generated by running the key derivation algorithm on inputs MK and I) and the remaining inputs provided by the adversary.
Forgery Finally, the adversary outputs an attempted forgery consisting of a list of identity-message pairs (I 1 , m 1 ) , . . . , (I n , m n ), for any i ∈ Z + of the adversary's choosing, and an aggregate signature σ. We say that the adversary succeeds if (1) the verification algorithm returns "True" on inputs PP, ((I 1 , m 1 ) , . . . , (I n , m n )), σ, (2) all of I 1 , . . . , I n are distinct, and (3) there is some 1 ≤ i * ≤ n such that during the attack phase the adversary made neither a CreateKey query on I i * nor any Aggregate query with the first two components as I i * and m i * .
We define the advantage of an adversary against an IBSAS scheme to be the probability it succeeds in the above experiment. We say that an IBSAS scheme is secure if the advantage of any PPT adversary against it is negligible.
A.2 Our Scheme
We now define our IBSAS scheme.
The setup algorithm chooses a bilinear group G of order N = p 1 p 2 p 3 . It chooses a random elements g, k ∈ G, and random exponents a, b, α, β ∈ Z N . It also chooses hash functions H 1 , H 2 , H 3 , H 4 : {0, 1} * → G and H 5 : {0, 1} * → Z N , which will be modeled as random oracles. It sets the public parameters as
and the master secret key as MK := {N, {H i } i=1,..,4 , G, a, b, α, β}.
KeyDer(MK, I) → SK I The key derivation algorithm outputs
as the signing key for identity I. 
xs where if i = 1 we let
Note that if we define r 1 = dlog g (σ 2 ) and r 2 = dlog g (σ 3 ), then the new aggregate signature has randomness r 1 = s −1 r 1 + x and r 2 = sr 2 . These values are random and mutually independent.
AggVerify(PP, ((I 1 , m n ) , . . . , (I n , m n )), σ) → {T rue, F alse} The aggregate verification algorithm first checks that I 1 , . . . , I n are all distinct. It then checks that:
We show correctness of the scheme by induction on i in the definition of correctness. For i = 1 this is straightforward. For i > 1 we derive the first equation checked by aggregate verification algorithm as follows:
where on the second line we use that by assumption the equation holds for (σ 1 , σ 2 , σ 3 ) if we remove (I i , m i ) from the list of identity-message pairs. An analogous derivation pertains to the second equation checked by the aggregate verification algorithm. Finally, the last equation checked by the aggregate verification algorithm is easy to derive.
Discussion Our scheme can be viewed as an extension of the prior IBSAS scheme of [15] (BGOY) in composite order rather than prime groups. Namely, the σ 1 , σ 2 , σ 3 components of our aggregate signature correspond exactly to a BGOY aggregate signature (in a composite order group). The additional σ 4 , σ 5 elements in our aggregate signature may be viewed as a "second copy" of the BGOY scheme tied together with the first copy by g and by r 1 , r 2 (defined as dlog g (σ 2 ) and dlog g (σ 3 ) respectively). This second copy is carried over to the corresponding public-key signature scheme in Section 5 and facilitates the security proof of the latter. However, note that the second copy is not "complete" in the sense that there is no component of the form k r1 , which is crucial for our security proof but introduces a new challenge for aggregation. Namely, it is important for the scheme's security that the aggregation process independently re-randomize both r 1 and r 2 . However, we cannot additively re-randomize r 1 and r 2 as r 1 + s and r 2 + x for random s, x as done in [15] , since in our case the signing algorithm would then need to form a "cross-term" k r1x to multiply into σ 5 , which is hard without k r1 . Instead we re-randomize r 2 multiplicatively as sr 2 but r 1 as s −1 r 1 + x in order to allow updating the randomness in σ 1 and σ 5 correctly without needing k r1 . We also note that while our security model for IBSAS schemes requires that the signers in an aggregate signature have distinct identities, this is mainly to simplify the security proof of our scheme. Indeed, it is possible to circumvent this issue for our scheme by using a technique introduced in [58] . Namely, if a signer I has previously added a signature on a message m to an aggregate (σ 1 , . . . , σ 5 ) and wishes to add another signature on a message m , it can set σ 1 := σ 1 H 2 (I) bH5(m m ) /H 2 (I) bH5(m) and similarly for σ 5 , and then re-randomize the aggregate signature as above.
A.3 Security Analysis
Unlike the prior BGOY scheme, our IBSAS scheme is provably-secure under static assumptions. This is a corollary of the following.
Theorem A.1. Under Assumption 5.5 and the assumption that the public-key signature scheme (using the Sign A algorithm) defined in Section 5 is existentially unforgeable, our IBSAS scheme is secure in the sense defined above.
Proof. Assume there is a PPT adversary A breaking the IBSAS scheme. In the first step of the proof, we change the real IBSAS security game Game real to a game Game real where the elements g, k in the public parameters as well as the outputs of random oracles H 1 , . . . , H 4 belong to the G p1 subgroup rather than the full group G. For this we use Assumption 5.5 that given G, N and a challenge T where either T ∈ G or T ∈ G p1 , it is hard to guess which one is the case. We give a simulator S that breaks this assumption if there is a non-negligible difference in A's advantage in Game real versus Game real . Simulator S given G, N and T runs A on public parameters Finally, A outputs as its attempted forgery an aggregate signature σ * = (σ * 1 , . . . , σ * 5 ) and a list of identitymessage pairs (I 1 , m 1 ) , . . . , (I n , m n ). If this is not a successful forgery, then we can ignore this attempt. Otherwise, let i * satisfy condition (3) of the forgery definition. If I j = I i,n * i for any 1 ≤ j = i * ≤ n and 1 ≤ i ≤ 4, or if I i * = I i,n * i for any 1 ≤ i ≤ 4, then B aborts. Otherwise, let H i (I j ) = g ti,j for 1 ≤ i ≤ 4 and 1 ≤ j ≤ n where the t i,j are known to B Then B updates σ * 1 and and σ * 5 as follows:
It outputs (σ * 1 , . . . , σ * 5 ) as its own forgery. This concludes the description of B. Observe that unless B aborts, it provides A with a perfect simulation of Game real ; in particular, this uses the fact that (as previously noted) our aggregation procedure independently re-randomizes both r 1 and r 2 . Furthermore, it is not hard to show that B outputs a forgery of its own whenever A does; this uses the fact that I 1 , . . . , I n in A's forgery are required to be distinct. Furthermore, B does not abort with probability at least 1/q 1 q 2 q 3 q 4 , which is inverse polynomial. (A somewhat tighter security reduction is possible using Coron's technique [33] .) This is because due to the rules of the IBSAS security game, B will not abort as long as it guesses the correct values of n * i for all 1 ≤ i ≤ 4, meaning that A queries I i * in its forgery as the n * i -th query to H i , and all these guesses are random and independent. The theorem follows.
B Security of Our Assumptions in the Generic Group Model
Though the assumptions we use are static and compact, some fall outside of the usual class of "subgroup decision" assumptions. As a check on these assumptions, we show they hold in the generic bilinear group model extended to the setting of composite order groups as in [52] , when it is hard to find a non-trivial factor of the group order N .
The Model We briefly describe the generic bilinear group model for composite order groups (or just "generic group model") and refer the reader to [52] for more details. Fix groups G, G T , each of the same order p 1 · · · p t , equipped with a bilinear map e : G × G → G T . In the generic group model, a group element x ∈ G is represented by a tuple (x 1 , . . . , x t ) where each x i ∈ Z pi is dlog gi (x) for a fixed generator g i of the G pi subgroup of G. Similarly, a group element in y ∈ G T is represented by a bracketed tuple [y 1 , . . . , y t ], with respect to the generators e(g i , g i ). An algorithm is not given access to the groups G, G T directly, but rather is provided with "handles" that correspond to group elements. The algorithm may query for the handle of a new group element in a limited number of ways. First, it may submit two handles for elements both in G or both in G T and it will receive in return the handle corresponding to their product under the group operation. It may also submit a handle and an exponent in Z N , and it will receive a handle corresponding to that group element raised to that exponent. It can also query for the handle of a result of a pairing operating by submitting the two handles of the elements in G to be paired. We limit the adversary to querying on handles it has previously received (this can be enforced by choosing random handles from a large enough set that the adversary can only a guess a new handle with negligible probability).
To show an assumption is hard in this model, we consider a game between an adversary and a challenger. The challenger will generate group elements according to the distribution specified in the assumption, and will give the adversary handles to the group elements that are given out in the assumption. The adversary then makes queries for handles of new elements, according to the allowed operations of group multiplication, exponentiation by an element of Z N , and pairing. It is the adversary's task to break the assumption.
We employ the strategy developed in [52] . We represent any group elements that are randomly chosen from a subgroup by a tuple with indeterminates (i.e., formal variables) in the corresponding positions. For example, a random element a ∈ G p1p2 would be represented by A = (A 1 , A 2 , 0 . . . , 0) where A 1 , A 2 are indeterminates. Dependencies between elements are expressed by re-using formal variables. In the original game, these random variables are instantiated by choosing group elements from the appropriate distributions and giving out these handles. However, we pass to an alternate game where the variables are never concretely instantiated, and the challenger instead keeps track of the formal variables, and only assigns group elements equal handles if they are the same as formal polynomials in the variables. The difference between this and the original game is negligible (assuming the polynomials in the formal variables have constant degree), since two unequal formal polynomials will only happen to be equal when instantiated with negligible probability. We can then make an additional change to the game by doing all computation modulo N instead of modulo p i in each component, since if this causes a difference, then a non-trivial factor of N can be computed, which we are assuming to be hard.
In addition to the terms explicitly given to the adversary in our assumptions, we will add a randomly distributed element of the full group, G. We denote this element by (Y 1 , Y 2 , Y 3 ). This models the fact that the adversary may have the capability to sample randomly from the full group. To see that giving the adversary a single randomly distributed group element suffices to model this sampling ability, consider an alternate game where the adversary is additionally able to query for a fresh random sample from G. If there exists an adversary A who breaks one of our assumptions in this model, then we can create an adversary B which breaks the assumption given only one randomly generated group element. This is because B can respond to the random sampling queries of A by taking its one group element and raising it to randomly chosen powers. We do not claim that this applies to all assumptions, since the internal views of B and A will differ. However, in our assumptions, the goal is merely to produce group elements with particular distributions, so A's success will always imply success for B.
We do not include a random generator for G T , since all of the assumptions we consider here require the adversary to produce elements in G, and elements of G T clearly do not aid the adversary in this task. We note that the theorems in [52] which were used in [56, 57] to show generic security for the subgroup decision assumptions that we also employ do not explicitly include generators of G or G T being given to the adversary, but the theorems still hold if one were to add these terms.
Theorem B.1. Assumption 4.3 holds in the generic group model if it is hard to find a non-trivial factor of N .
Proof. Here the adversary is given
such that
and a 2 , b 2 = 0, a 1 = 0. Since the adversary can only produce linear combinations in Z N of the terms it is given, it must use the (R 1 A 2 1 , V 2 , 0) term to introduce a non-zero A 2 1 term in a. However, this introduces a nonzero contribution from V 2 in a 2 , and this cannot be canceled out because V 2 does not appear elsewhere.
Theorem B.2. Assumption 5.4 holds in the generic group model if it is hard to find a non-trivial factor of N .
Proof. Here the adversary if given
and must compute (C 1 C 2 , 0, 0). Since the adversary can only take linear combinations of the received terms, it must use non-zero contribution from (C 1 C 2 , 0, X 3 ), but this also yields a non-zero contribution from X 3 in the third coordinate, which cannot be canceled out because X 3 does not appear elsewhere.
Theorem B.3. Assumption 5.2 holds in the generic group model if it is hard to find a non-trivial factor of N .
Proof. Here is the adversary given
and a 2 = 0. Let's write
where the coefficients are in Z N . Consider the coefficients of 
C BB-Derived Signatures
In this section, we will improve upon a signature scheme implied by a variant of the IBE scheme introduced by Boneh and Boyen [16] as a final example of leveraging the dual form signature framework.
Naor observed that if an IBE scheme is adaptively secure, then the implied signature scheme is also secure under the same complexity assumptions [19] . The IBE scheme originally proposed by Boneh and Boyen was only shown to be selectively secure. However, Waters proposed a variant of the Boneh-Boyen scheme with linear-size public keys that was shown to be adaptively secure [71] . Unfortunately, these linear size public keys would carry over to the implied signature scheme.
Our starting point is a variant of the Boneh-Boyen IBE introduced by Lewko and Waters [56] . By embedding the Boneh-Boyen scheme in composite order groups, Lewko and Waters were able to keep the constant-size public keys and show that the scheme is adaptively secure. This yields an implied signature scheme which has constant-size signatures and is existentially unforgeable. (By "constant-size", we mean a constant number of group elements. The group size will depend on the security parameter.) Our signature scheme is a more efficient version of this, where verification is done directly instead of through IBE encryption. Because of this modification, security for our scheme does not follow from the security of the related IBE scheme.
In our scheme, the Boneh-Boyen structure takes place in G p1 , while G p3 is used for additional randomization, and the difference between the two signing algorithms appears in G p2 . Namely, signatures produced by Sign A have no G p2 components, while signatures produced by Sign B have random G p2 components. We define the forgery types similarly: Type I forgeries have no G p2 components, while Type II forgeries have at least one nonzero G p2 component. As for CL signatures, we prove dual-oracle invariance by designing a backdoor verification test that the simulator can perform to reveal the presence of G p2 components in the forgery produced by the attacker. To perform this test, the simulator uses knowledge of the discrete logarithms of some of the public parameters u and h that form the core of the Boneh-Boyen structure. More precisely, in the G p1 group our signatures are of the form g r , g α (u m h) r , where g, u, h are public parameters, α is secret, and r is chosen randomly each time. In the proof, the simulator will know the discrete logarithms of u and h base g (denoted by a and b respectively), which will allow it to perform a backdoor verification which is like the real verification, except that the base g has been replaced by another a group element of the simulator's choice. Since the public parameters reveal no information about a and b modulo p 2 and a + bm is a pairwise independent function of m, we are able to show that the challenge signature does not reveal enough information about the space on which the backdoor test fails to enable the attacker to produce a forgery for some new message m * that causes the simulator to mistake its type.
C.1 Our Dual Form Scheme
We now give our dual form version of BB-derived signatures.
KeyGen(λ):
The key generation algorithm chooses two groups, G and G T of order N = p 1 p 2 p 3 , where p 1 , p 2 , and p 3 are distinct primes of length λ and e : G × G → G T is a non-degenerate, efficiently computable bilinear map. It selects uniformly at random u, g, h ∈ G p1 and α ∈ Z N . It sets
and
where g 2,3 and g 3 are generators of the subgroups G p2p3 and G p3 , respectively.
, and a message m ∈ Z * N , the algorithm chooses r ∈ Z N and R 3 , R 3 ∈ G p3 uniformly at random (we note that random elements in G p3 can be generated by raising the generator g 3 to random exponents in Z N ). It outputs the signature
Sign B (SK, M ): Given a secret key SK = (α, g 2,3 , g 3 ), a public key P K = (N, u, g, h, e(g, g) α ), and a message m ∈ Z * N , the algorithm chooses r ∈ Z N and R 2,3 , R 2,3 ∈ G p2p3 uniformly at random. It outputs the signature
Verify(P K, m, σ): Given a public key P K = (N, u, g, h, e(g, g) α ), a message m, and a signature σ = (σ 2 , σ 1 ), the verification algorithm checks that
Forgery Classes We will divide the forgery types based on whether they have a G p2 component. We let z ∈ Z N denote the exponent represented by the tuple (0 mod p 1 , 1 mod p 2 , 0 mod p 3 ). Then we can define the forgery classes as follows:
C.2 Complexity Assumptions
We employ the same three static assumptions used to prove security for the LW IBE scheme [56] . The first two of these were previously stated in Section 4.2, so here we only state the third.
Assumption C.1. Given a group generator G, we define the following distribution:
We define the advantage of an algorithm, A, in breaking Assumption C.1 to be:
Definition 9. We say that G satisfies Assumption C.1 if for any polynomial time algorithm, A, Adv
C.3 Proof of Security
We will show that our new signature scheme is secure under these assumptions by showing that it satisfies the three properties of a secure dual form signature scheme.
Lemma C.1. If Assumption 4.1 holds, then our signature scheme is A-I Matching.
Proof. Suppose that there exists an attacker, A, that can create a forgery that is not of Type I with probability given access to an oracle for the Sign A algorithm. Then we can create an algorithm B that breaks Assumption 4.1 with advantage negligibly close to .
B first receives g, X 3 , T . B then randomly chooses exponents α, a, b ∈ Z N and sets SK = (α, X 3 ) and P K = (N, u = g a , g = g, h = g b , e(g, g) α = e(g, g) α ). Notice that the Sign A algorithm does not use g 2,3 , so B does not need it in the secret key. For a query m, B chooses r, u, v ∈ Z N uniformly at random and outputs the signature, σ = (g r X u 3 , g α (u m h) r X v 3 ). Eventually, A will output a forgery, (σ * , m * ). First, B will check that the forgery verifies, if not then B will output b ∈ {0, 1} uniformly at random. If the forgery verifies, then B will try to use this forgery to determine whether T is in G p1 or G p1p2 .
B sets C 0 = e(T, g) α , C 1 = T am * +b , C 2 = T.
Then B proceeds with a backdoor verification test using the C values as follows, e(σ 1 , C 2 ) e(σ 2 , C 1 ) = C 0 .
Since it is guaranteed that (σ * , m * ) passes the real verification test, we know that it will pass this verification equation with T = g s for any exponent s ∈ Z N . However, since we do not know if T ∈ G p1 , we do not know if we can express T simply as g s . In general, we can break T into its separate subgroup components as follows,
where g 2 is some generator for G p2 and the exponents s and t 2 are random, unless T ∈ G p1 , in which case t 2 = 0. Likewise, we can divide the signature elements into their components, = C 0 .
If this equality is false, then B will output 1. If the equality is true, then B will flip a coin b ∈ {0, 1} and return b. Notice that if B tried to create its own signatures using T , if they were verifiable then they would always pass this additional verification test. This means that B cannot gain any advantage against the Assumption 4.1 challenger without using the output of A. It must either be the case that T ∈ G p1 or T ∈ G p1p2 . If T ∈ G p1 , then t 2 = 0 and the equality will always hold. In this case B will output 1 with probability 1/2.
If T ∈ G p1p2 , then t 2 = 0, so B will pass the verification depending on the values of s 2,2 and s 1,2 . If A returns a Type I forgery, then s 2,2 = s 1,2 = 0 so s 1,2 = s 2,2 (am * + b) and the forgery will always pass both verification tests. In this case B will output 1 with probability 1/2.
If T ∈ G p1p2 and A returns a Type II forgery (i.e. any forgery that is not of Type I), then either s 1,2 = s 2,2 (am * + b) or s 1,2 = s 2,2 (am * + b). If s 1,2 = s 2,2 (am * + b), then the forgery will always pass the second verification test and B will output 1 with probability 1/2. However, in order for an attacker to create a Type II forgery where s 1,2 = s 2,2 (am * + b), the attacker must be able to implicitly determine am * + b modulo p 2 . Of course, m * will be known to the attacker, but a and b modulo p 2 are not revealed at any point during the query phase, so there is a negligible chance, δ, of an attacker being able to create a Type II forgery that passes the second verification test.
Finally, if T ∈ G p1p2 and s 1,2 = s 2,2 (am * + b) then the test will always fail, so B will output a 1 with probability 1. Thus, we can calculate the advantage of B agains the Assumption 4. Thus, if is non-negligible, then B has non-negligible advantage against the Assumption 4.1 challenger.
Lemma C.2. If Assumption 4.2 holds, then our signature scheme satisfies dual-oracle invariance.
Proof. Suppose that there exists an attacker, A, that can break dual-oracle invariance with non-negligible advantage. Then we can create an algorithm B that breaks Assumption 4.2 with non-negligible advantage. B receives G, g, X 1 X 2 , X 3 , Y 2 Y 3 , T . B picks random exponents a, b, α ∈ Z N and sets P K = (N, u = g a , g = g, h = g b , e(g, g) α = e(g, g) α ) and SK = (α, X 3 , Y 2 Y 3 ). Using these keys, B will be able to simulate both the Sign A and the Sign B algorithms.
If A requests a signature from the Sign A oracle for a message m, B chooses r, u, v ∈ Z N randomly and outputs the signature
Likewise, if A requests a signature from the Sign B oracle for a message m, then B chooses r, u, v ∈ Z N randomly and outputs the signature
Finally, A will query B on some challenge message, m. B will choose a random u ∈ Z N , and return the challenge signature σ = (T, g α T am+b X u 3 ). Clearly, if T ∈ G p1p3 , then the challenge signature will be a correctly formed signature from the Sign A algorithm, and if T ∈ G, then the challenge signature will be a correctly formed signature from the Sign B algorithm. Note that am + b modulo p 2 will not be correlated with a and b modulo p 1 , so the second element will be randomly distributed in the G p2 subgroup.
Once A returns the forgery, (σ * , m * ), B must first check that A has not seen a signature for m * before and that (σ * , m * ) verifies. If either of these checks fail then B will guess randomly. If both of these are true, then B must determine what forgery class (σ * , m * ) belongs to in order to determine what subgroup T is in. To distinguish between the forgery types, B must use a backdoor verification test similar to the one used in the proof of Lemma C.1. B sets
and checks if e(σ 1 , C 2 ) e(σ 2 , C 1 ) = C 0 .
As we did in the proof of Lemma C.1, we can separate X 1 X 2 into its subgroup components,
where g 2 is some generator for the subgroup G p2 and s and x 2 are random exponents from Z * N . As before, note that since (σ * , m * ) passes the real verification equation, it will pass this backdoor verification in the G p1 subgroup. We can also rewrite the forgery elements in terms of their subgroup components, = e(g, g) αs e(g 2 , g 2 ) x2(s1,2−s2,2(am * +b)) = C 0 e(g 2 , g 2 ) x2(s1,2−s2,2(am * +b)) ?
This gives us a result similar to the proof of Lemma C.1. However, in this case we know that x 2 is nonzero, so a forgery will only pass this verification test if s 1,2 = s 2,2 (am * + b). Thus, if the forgery fails the test, then with probability 1 it is a Type II forgery. If the forgery passes the test then it can be either Type I or Type II. If σ * is a Type I forgery, then s 2,2 = s 1,2 = 0, and it will pass this backdoor verification test. We claim that a Type II forgery can also pass the additional verification test, but only with negligible probability.
In order to create a Type II forgery where s 1,2 = s 2,2 (am * + b), an attacker must implicitly determine am * + b modulo p 2 . Of course, m * will be known to the attacker. However, during the query phase, no information about the values of a and b modulo p 2 is revealed. Therefore, if an attacker is to determine the values of a and b modulo p 2 , it must be from the challenge signature.
In the challenge signature, a and b are only included in the second signature element. Thus, from the challenge signature, the attacker can derive the single value am + b modulo p 2 . However, this single equation has two unknowns (a and b), and it is impossible to determine the unique values of a and b modulo p 2 . Moreover, am + b is a pairwise independent function of m modulo p 2 . Therefore, the attacker has no better than the negligible probability of achieving the correct value of am * + b modulo p 2 , as long as m = m * modulo p 2 . It is possible that m * is equal to m modulo p 2 , but unequal to m modulo N . If this occurs with non-negligible probability, then B can extract a non-trivial factor of N by computing the g.c.d of N and m − m * . This non-trivial factor can be used to break Assumption 4.2 with non-negligible advantage, as proven in [56] . Thus, we may assume that m = m * modulo p 2 , except with negligible probability. Hence, if a forgery passes the additional verification test, then with high probability it is a Type I forgery.
Lemma C.3. If Assumption C.1 holds, then our signature scheme is B-II Matching.
Suppose that T is selected randomly from G T , then with all but negligible probability r = 1. This means that the additional verification equation will fail with all but with some negligible probability, δ. In this case B will output 1 with probability 1/2.
On the other hand, consider the case where T = e(g, g) αs . With probability , A will produce a Type I forgery where it is guaranteed that s 2,2 = s 1,2 = 0. In this case, since (σ * , m * ) passes the real verification test, it must pass the backdoor verification test, meaning that B will output 1 with probability 1.
If T = e(g, g) αs and A produces a Type II forgery, where s 1,2 = s 2,2 (am + b), then the verification equation will be false and B will output 1 with probability 1/2. If A produces a Type II forgery where s 1,2 = s 2,2 (am + b), since (σ * , m * ) passes the real verification test, the equation will be true and B will output 1. However, a and b modulo p 2 are not given out at all during the query phase, so the probability of A achieving this correlation will be some negligible probability, δ .
Given all these possibilities, we can calculate the advantage of B as follows, 
which is non-negligible.
